Martin plans to present a simple encryption scheme which unlike RSA is believed to be secure against quantum computers. For this, he will start with revisiting how RSA encryption works, why the well-known textbook RSA is insecure, how RSA fails in practice when poor random number generators are used and how, somewhat surprisingly, adding a bit of noise to the underlying problem results in schemes that are believed to be secure in a post-quantum world. He will also talk about algorithms to attack this scheme and, time permitting, what all that has to do with Google’s post-quantum experiment in Chrome.
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Martin is a lecturer in the Information Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London. His research is focused on all aspects of cryptography. He works on algorithms for solving the mathematical problems underlying it, on post-quantum security and fully homomorphic encryption. He also works on the cryptanalysis of deployed cryptographic protocols and implementations (SSH, TLS). He teaches applied cryptography and penetration testing.